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Abstract
The article contributes to the quest to relate global data on brain and behavior (e.g. from PET, Positron Emission Tomography, and fMRI,
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) to the underpinning neural networks. Models tied to human brain imaging data often focus on a few
“boxes” based on brain regions associated with exceptionally high blood flow, rather than analyzing the cooperative computation of multiple
brain regions. For analysis directly at the level of such data, a schema-based model may be most appropriate. To further address neuro-
physiological data, the Synthetic PET imaging method uses computational models of biological neural circuitry based on animal data to
predict and analyze the results of human PET studies. This technique makes use of the hypothesis that rCBF (regional cerebral blood flow) is
correlated with the integrated synaptic activity in a localized brain region. We also describe the possible extension of the Synthetic PET
method to fMRI. The second half of the paper then exemplifies this general research program with two case studies, one on visuo-motor
processing for control of grasping (Section 3 in which the focus is on Synthetic PET) and the imitation of motor skills (Sections 4 and 5, with
a focus on Synthetic fMRI). Our discussion of imitation pays particular attention to data on the mirror system in monkey (neural circuitry
which allows the brain to recognize actions as well as execute them). Finally, Section 6 outlines the immense challenges in integrating
models of different portions of the nervous system which address detailed neurophysiological data from studies of primates and other species;
summarizes key issues for developing the methodology of Synthetic Brain Imaging; and shows how comparative neuroscience and evolu-
tionary arguments will allow us to extend Synthetic Brain Imaging even to language and other cognitive functions for which few or no animal
data are available. q 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
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1. Global brain function
This paper is part of a Special Issue of Neural Networks on
the subject “The Global Brain: Imaging and Neural Model-
ing”, with an emphasis on relating brain imaging data to “the
activities of the underpinning neural networks, considered at
the most appropriate level”. The Call for Papers states that
“The hope of … deriving a simple theoretical understanding
of the action of the brain drives the research at both theoretical
and experimental levels”. This raises many challenging issues:
1.1. Which “global brain”?
Which “global brain”? A human brain, a monkey brain
(and which species?) or some other brain? If a human brain,
is it a mature brain, a developing brain, or a diseased brain?
A male brain or a female brain? And what of individual
differences? What of brain–body interactions? What of
the effects of nature and nurture and social circumstance?
We suspect that this very diversity makes “a simple theore-
tical understanding of the action of the brain” impossible.
However, we believe that continuing study can develop a
large store of models and methods which will let us inte-
grate our insights into diverse brain mechanisms and beha-
viors, helping us to see order in complexity even if we
cannot achieve simplicity. In particular, this paper will
introduce our insight that data on the anatomy and physiol-
ogy of the macaque monkey and the imaging of adult
humans can contribute together to an integrated view of
what might otherwise seem quite disparate behaviors:
visually guided grasping, imitation, and language (Arbib,
2000; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
Data on the mirror system (neural circuitry which allows
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the brain to recognize actions as well as execute them) in
monkey provide the integrating factor.
1.2. The discrepancy between brain imaging and
neurophysiology
We note the discrepancy between the methodologies
employed for gaining data on brain imaging and on the
underpinning biological networks:
1. A brain imaging experiment typically operates at the task
level: given a pair of tasks and some level of significance,
find all areas of the brain as indicated by “blobs” which
signal that part of the brain is significantly more active in
task A rather than task B. It is common to interpret such a
“blob” as indicating that a specific brain region X is
crucial to task A but not to task B. A key challenge is
then to go beyond the “blob” that indicates a statistical
confidence measure for differences in rCBF to an under-
standing of actual “information processing” in neural
networks. Brain imaging presents a problem of “too
much” and “too little” — “too much” because its global
view of brain activity may draw our attention to many
brain regions whose causal role in the given task is
unclear; “too little” because, in emphasizing regions
“especially active” in the given task, it may downplay
the role of regions whose activity, while not yielding a
large rCBF signal, is nonetheless crucial to the neural
implementation of the task.
2. Neurophysiological data are normally gathered in experi-
ments on animals rather than humans. They typically
focus on just one, or very few, brain regions considered
relevant to execution of a given task. They thus lack the
“global assay” of brain imaging, but offer the advantages
of combining greater attention to parametric variation of
the task with detailed insights into the variation of activ-
ity in neurons in such a way as to constrain hypotheses on
actual circuitry. The disadvantage is that since each
neurophysiological experiment is “local” as to task and
circuitry, and since protocols for even apparently similar
experiments differ greatly, there may be major interpre-
tive challenges in integrating data from different experi-
ments.
1.3. “Underpinning” neural networks
Much work in this journal has concerned artificial neural
networks — a parallel, often adaptive, computing structure,
usually inspired only loosely by neurobiology, which
performs satisfactorily some given function. But the word
“underpinning” implies some measure of biological
constraint. The loosest constraint is to have a modular neural
network in which each subnetwork is taken to represent the
function of a particular brain region, but there is no constraint
on the internal workings of the network. Some of the modeling
described below is of this category, but we often add (as in the
FARS model below) the constraint that the components of the
subnetwork match the anatomical characterization of cell
types in the brain region being modeled and explain the neuro-
physiological data gathered from such neurons when the
animal performs the task of interest. Let us reserve the term
“biological neural network” for a neural network designed to
model a specific brain region or set of brain regions, and whose
unit neurons are constrained to match some neurophysiologi-
cal data. More detailed models may attend to the dendritic
structure of individual neurons, or the neurochemistry of,
e.g. cellular activity.
While there are many ways to represent neural networks
for computer simulation, the models described (with more
or less detail) in this paper (Sections 3.1, 5.2, and 6.1) adopt
the very simple leaky integrator model of the neuron, in
which the internal state of the neuron is described by a
single variable, the membrane potential m(t) at the spike
initiation zone. The time evolution of m(t) is given by:
t
dmt
dt  2mt1
X
i
wiXit1 h 1
with resting level h, time constant t , Xi(t) the firing rate at
the ith input, and wi the corresponding synaptic weight. We
usually define the firing rate as a continuously varying
measure of the cell’s activity. The firing rate is approxi-
mated by a sigmoid function of the membrane potential,
Mt  smt; except in some modules of the imitation
model (Section 5.2).
Another form of simplification is that, whereas brain
imaging implicates a large number of brain regions in
even apparently simple tasks, most specific models of biolo-
gical neural networks usually include models of only a small
selection of the brain regions for which neurophysiological
data have been gathered for the task under consideration. In
view of this, Section 6.1 quickly reviews several studies
from the Arbiblaboratory to indicate the challenges in inte-
grating models of different portions of the nervous system to
yield an integrated model that provides insight into all the
brain regions implicated by human brain imaging in a given
family of tasks.
1.4. Schema theory
A “connectionist” model employing an artificial neural
network has no greater relevance to neurobiology than any
other functional model. Indeed, in some cases such models
may be positively misleading if they lead to spurious iden-
tifications of elements of, say, a backpropagation network
with specific neurons of the visual system. It is thus impor-
tant to have a language in which to express functional
decompositions of the implementation of some behavior
in such a way that neuralization of the components is
open to analysis, rather than being built in. Arbib (1981)
showed how to analyze perceptual structures and distributed
motor control in terms of interacting schemas (functional
units); schema theory has been extended to cognitive
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systems as well (see, e.g. Arbib, Conklin, & Hill, 1987).
Two important tenets of schema theory are:
1. Schemas may be defined at different granularities. For
example, the schemas defining some overall task like
visual control of hand movements are at a far higher
level than the motor schemas for specific goal-related
actions such as grasping, tearing, or holding. However,
the high-level schemas contribute to each of the motor
schemas for specific actions. It is thus dangerous to say
that specific neurons “encode” an action when in fact it
may take correlated activity in neurons in a variety of
brain regions to “commit” the brain to the specific action.
(We will need to recall this caveat when we discuss our
preliminary attempts to model the mirror system in
Section 6.1.)
2. Reinforcing this point, a schema defined functionally will
in general require the interaction (“cooperative computa-
tion”) of multiple brain regions for its implementation;
conversely, a given brain region will contribute to multi-
ple schemas. Thus although we will speculate below on
how various schemas may be assigned to specific brain
regions in the macaque (and thus, presumably, to a homo-
logous region in the human), we expect that further
research will lead to more subtle insights into the anato-
mical distribution of each schema.
1.5. Boxology, schemas, and synthetic PET
The danger of models based on human brain imaging,
then, is that they tend to focus on a few “boxes” based on
brain regions associated with “blobs” of exceptionally high
blood flow, rather than analyzing the cooperative computa-
tion of multiple brain regions. For analysis directly at the
level of such data — augmenting the data of brain imaging
with a variety of neurological insights — a schema-based
model may be most appropriate, offering in the end a
causally complete model of how some task may be imple-
mented, achieving success to the extent to which activity of
certain of the high-level schemas in the overall coordinated
control program (Arbib, 1981) can be identified with activ-
ity observed through brain imaging. However, to relate
brain imaging data to “the activities of the underpinning
neural networks”, we offer a method — Synthetic PET
imaging (Arbib, Biscoff, Fagg, & Grafton, 1995) and its
generalizations — which uses neural models based on,
e.g. primate, neurophysiology to predict and analyze results
of brain imaging for a variety of human behaviors. This
approach is very different from the approach of covariance
structural modeling (CSEM) developed by many authors
from McIntosh and Gonzalez-Lima (1994) to Taylor,
Krause, Shah, Horwitz, and Mueller-Gaertner (2000).
CSEM makes no use of animal data to constrain our insights
into the human brain. Instead, it uses randomness and line-
arity assumptions to infer task-dependent patterns of
connectivity from the covariances observed in the brain
imaging data. However, such “effective connectivity” is a
task-dependent “projection” of actual synaptic connections.
It is thus a task for future research to understand how
to relax the CSEM assumptions and synthesize the “true
connectivity” of brain regions from the effective connectiv-
ities revealed in a wide range of tasks.
1.6. The shape of the paper
Section 2 introduces the Synthetic PET method and
discusses its extension to fMRI (functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging). Section 3 then exemplifies Synthetic PET
methodology by reviewing our earlier work on a detailed
biological neural network model for visually directed grasp-
ing (the FARS model; Fagg & Arbib, 1998) and reports on
the comparison of Synthetic PET predictions with our PET
studies of human reaching and grasping. As a background
for our second case study, Section 4 introduces data on the
mirror system in monkey (neural circuitry which allows the
brain to recognize actions as well as execute them), a system
which we believe holds the key to the human capacity for
both imitation (discussed at length in Section 5) and
language (discussed briefly in Section 6). With this back-
ground, Section 5 summarizes our recent fMRI study of a
simple form of imitation and relates it to a loosely biological
model (i.e. made of modules in which each is a neural
network identified with a brain region, but in which each
module is implemented as a connectionist, rather than
neurophysiologically constrained, neural network). Finally,
Section 6 looks at the many facets of global modeling, with
a sampler of detailed modeling of the kind needed to ground
future global models (modeling the mirror system, the basal
ganglia and sequential behavior, and the cerebellum and the
coordination of reach and grasp), a brief look at our views
on the relevance of mirror neurons and imitation to
language, and a concluding perspective on homologies,
brain imaging and neural networks.
2. Synthetic brain imaging defined
In order to provide a causal account of brain function
constrained by data from both primate neurophysiology and
human brain imaging, we need a method of “Synthetic Brain
imaging”. We first recall the definition (Arbib et al., 1995) of
Synthetic PET imaging — using neural models based on
primate neurophysiology to predict and analyze results from
PET (Positron Emission Tomography) brain imaging taken
during a variety of human behaviors. The key hypothesis is
that PET is correlated with regional cerebral blood flow
(rCBF) and that this in turn correlates with the integrated
synaptic activity in a region, and thus reflects in part neural
activity in regions afferent to the region studied, rather than
intrinsic neural activity of the region alone. However, the
method can potentially accommodate other hypotheses on
single cell correlates of imaged activity, and can thus be
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applied to other imaging techniques, and so we also discuss the
extension of the methodology to Synthetic fMRI. These two
approaches will be exemplified in Section 3 [Grasp Control
and (Synthetic) PET], and Section 5 [Imitation and (Synthetic)
fMRI]. For other approaches to relating neural modeling and
functional brain imaging, and cognition, see Horwitz,
Tagamets, and McIntosh (1999), Tagamets and Horwitz
(1998) and Taylor et al. (2000).
2.1. Defining synthetic PET
Mapping the activity simulated in neural network models
of interacting brain regions — based on, say, single-cell
recordings in behaving monkeys — into predictions of
activity values to be recorded from corresponding regions
of the human brain by imaging techniques such as PET
involves two primary problems: localization, and modeling
activation.
(i) Localization: Each array in the neural network model
represents a neural population in a region identified anato-
mically and physiologically in the monkey brain. A
Synthetic PET comparison requires explicit hypotheses stat-
ing that each such region A is homologous to a region h(A)
in the human brain such that — within the tasks under
consideration — A and h(A) perform their tasks in the
same way. In some cases, such homologies are well defined.
In other cases, the existence or identity of such a homology
is an open question. Thus, the comparison of a Synthetic
PET study with the results of a human brain scan study will,
inter alia, be a test of the hypothesis “h(A) in human is
homologous to A in (a given species of) monkey”, and
comparison of synthetic and human studies may suggest a
new homology to be tested in further studies.
(ii) Modeling activation: PET typically measures regional
cerebral blood flow (rCBF). Arbib et al. (1995) hypothesize
that the counts acquired in PET scans are correlated with
local synaptic activity in a particular region (Brownell,
Budinger, Lauterbur, & McGeeer, 1982; Fox & Raichle,
1985) and call this measure the “raw PET activity”.
However, PET studies typically do not work directly with
these values, but with the comparative values of this activity
in a given region for two different tasks or behaviors. We
thus define our computational method in two stages:
(a) Compute rPETA, the simulated value of raw PET
activity, for each region A of our network while it is used
to simulate the monkey’s neural activity in some given task:
rPETA 
Zt1
t0
X
B
wB!At dt 2
where A is the region of interest, the sum is over all regions
B that project to A, wB!A(t) is the synaptic activity (firing
rate £ usynaptic strengthu) summed over all the synapses
from region B to region A at time t, and the time interval
from t0 to t1 corresponds to the duration of the scan.
(b) Compare the activities computed for two different
tasks. The comparative activity PETA(1/2) for task 1 over
task 2 for each region A is then given by:
PETA1=2  rPETA12 rPETA2
rPETA2 3
where rPETA(i) is the value of rPETA in condition i, to
compare the change in PETA from task 2 to task 1. In the
present study we use a different measure, defining the
change in relative synaptic activity for region A from task
1 to task 2 with max(rPETA(1), rPETA(2)) replacing
rPETA(2) in the denominator of Eq. (3), which gives a
more robust measure of relative activity. In either case,
the result is a Synthetic PET comparison, which presents
our prediction of human brain activity, as based on neural
network modeling constrained by monkey neurophysiology
and known functional neuroanatomy.
Note that we are comparing synaptic activity for each
region A, not the neural activity of A (though, as we shall
stress at the end of Section 2.2, it is an open research issue
to determine how often the difference between these
measures is significant). Indeed, Taylor et al. (2000) state
that although few experiments have been performed to test
the suggestion (Arbib et al., 1995; Jueptner & Weiller, 1995;
Tagamets & Horwitz, 1998) that inhibition be treated in the
sum with the same (positive) weight as excitation, “the few
good ones have supported this view (see Horwitz & Sporns,
1994; Jueptner & Weiller, 1995, for reviews).” As a compu-
tational plus (going beyond the imaging technology), we
may also collect the contributions of the excitatory and
inhibitory synapses separately, based on evaluating the inte-
gral in (1) over one set of synapses or the other. Using
Synthetic PET, we can break apart different factors that
contribute to the measure of synaptic activity so that they
can be studied independently. This can allow a much more
informed view of the actual PET data that are collected,
possibly shedding light on apparent contradictions that
arise from interpreting rCBF simply as cell activity (an
example has been demonstrated in Arbib et al., 1995).
2.2. Extending synthetic PET to synthetic fMRI
For the present paper, we shall assume that Synthetic PET
and Synthetic fMRI (functional MRI) are defined by
precisely the same formula except for a possible difference
in temporal and spatial resolution. In this section, we briefly
discuss some necessary steps for future research directed
towards more realistic approaches to various modalities of
Synthetic Brain Imaging (SBI).
Our current measure of “raw PET activity”, based on a
linear function of the total of the absolute value of synaptic
activity, already (as we shall demonstrate in Section 3)
yields qualitatively useful results in evaluating the sign
and small versus large magnitude of activities seen in PET
comparisons. However, we do not claim that this first
approximation yields quantitatively accurate predictions.
We note, as a target for further research on Synthetic
Brain Imaging, the interest of evaluating a variety of more
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quantitative fits based on (possibly nonlinear) combinations
of cell firing rates, synaptic change, and synaptic activity per
se. We also need to add a stochastic analysis to account for
the variation in PET activity seen in the same subject on
different trials.
It also worth noting that future developments in SBI
will probably need to be based on neural network models
extended to include the “vampire model” of the neuron,
i.e. looking at interactions between neurons, glia, and
blood vessels to model more explicitly the way in which
neurons “suck blood”, embedding the study of their infor-
mation processing in a richer model of the metabolic
underpinnings of these computations. For example, when
the activity of a brain region increases, the, e.g. PET
signal for that region increases not only in intensity but
also in volume. However, this need not imply that more
neurons are being recruited, only that increased blood flow
to the same set of neurons means that an increased rCBF
signal will be detected in nearby blood vessels connecting
to and from the blood vessels of the stated region. For
example, if the probability of a square millimeter of tissue
sharing blood supply with another square millimeter drops
off linearly with the distance between them, then the
diameter of a circle of above threshold rCBF will increase
linearly as the rCBF within a target region increases. Of
course, more detailed studies of activation would have to
be based on sophisticated 3D maps of blood supply to
complement the maps of patterns of neural innervations
used in the Synthetic PET method. Unfortunately, these
maps are not yet available. Moreover, it must be acknowl-
edged that the relation between neuronal firing, synaptic
activity, and metabolic activity is still not entirely under-
stood and that different models have been proposed, based
on both theoretical considerations and empirical findings
(Raichle, 1998). As far as synthetic PET and synthetic
fMRI are concerned, we argue below that we can apply
similar formulas to both approaches on the basis of the
following considerations:
The Blood Oxygenation Level-Dependent (BOLD) fMRI
signal is currently interpreted as mainly driven by a regional
change in the ratio between deoxyhemoglobin and oxyhe-
moglobin, due to the increased influx of oxygenated blood
in a given brain region with increased metabolic demand.
The blood influx is estimated to be larger than is required by
the increased metabolic demand. Thus, a relative decrease
in deoxyhemoglobin (i.e. after oxygen has been removed to
serve metabolism), compared to oxyhemoglobin, would
result in signal increase due to the different magnetic prop-
erties of the two molecules. A change in the ratio between
deoxyhemoglobin and oxyhemoglobin, however, could, in
principle, result from increased blood volume, determining
an increase in the water fraction around deoxyhemoglobin.
Thus, a change in blood volume without a change in blood
flow may determine the same signal increase determined by
an increase in blood flow. With regard to our paper, and to
the plausibility of adopting the synthetic PET approach to
model BOLD fMRI signal, a fair analysis of a wealth of
empirical evidence (the detailed review of which is beyond
the scope of the present article) suggests the following
conclusions:
1. The BOLD signal is probably composed of two main
factors, blood flow changes and blood volume changes
(plus some other minor factors probably contributing
very little to the signal, thus negligible here) (Hess, Stil-
ler, Kaulisch, & Scheich, 2000).
2. In spite of this, the BOLD signal co-localizes fairly well
with the PET signal and with TMS mapping (i.e. using
transcranial magnetic stimulation) of cortical representa-
tion of functions (Paus, 1999; Ro, Cheifet, Ingle, Shoup,
& Rafal, 1999), and, at least in the monkey, with changes
in the local field potential (N. Logothetis, personal
communication) that are considered the expression of
neural activity at population level. Also, quantitative esti-
mates of single-unit activity in macaques and BOLD
fMRI in humans in response to motion coherence in the
MT/V5 complex suggest that BOLD fMRI is propor-
tional to firing rate (Rees, Friston, & Koch, 2000).
3. Taken together, these data suggest that blood volume
effects do not dramatically alter the relation between
the PET signal and BOLD signal on one side, and
BOLD signal and regional neural activity on the other.
4. Moreover, quantitative differences between integrated
synaptic activity and neuronal firing are presumably
small and negligible. This may be due to the following
considerations:
(4a) most of the regional metabolic demand due to
neuronal activity is eminently synaptic (Yarowsky,
Kadekaro, & Sokoloff, 1983);
(4b) the relationship between firing rate and metabolic
synaptic activity is approximately linear (Kadekaro et
al., 1987);
(4c) the overwhelming majority of synapses are
local (Douglas, Koch, Mahowald, Martin, & Suarez,
1995);
(4d) a high level of cortical inhibition, resulting in
low firing rate and high metabolic activity, is unli-
kely to be long lasting (van Vreeswijk & Sompo-
linsky, 1998).
However, possible discrepancies between measures based
on synaptic activity and neuronal firing — and measures
which also explore the metabolic costs of synaptic change
— will be a topic for future consideration. In the present
paper, we will first report on a Synthetic PET study of grasping
behavior in which we use the synaptic activity measure,
whereas in the Synthetic fMRI experiments for imitation
described below we calculated the integral over time of the
neural activity and not the synaptic one, since in the DRAMA
network used in that model the synaptic weight have a different
meaning than in the classical Perceptron model and would not
relate directly to the neural activity.
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3. Grasp control and (synthetic) PET
The first Synthetic PET study (Arbib et al., 1995) focused
on Synthetic PET predictions based on a model of Dominey
and Arbib (1992); of mechanisms in the monkey brain for
control of saccadic eye movements. Here we summarize a
follow-up study (Arbib, Fagg, & Grafton, 2000), based on
the FARS (Fagg–Arbib–Rizzolatti–Sakata) model of the
grasping process of parietal–premotor interactions in the
visual control of monkey grasping movements. We first
summarize key properties of the FARS model, then show
how we used it to generate Synthetic PET predictions which
were then compared to a new PET study of human grasping
(Grafton, Fagg, & Arbib, 1998).
3.1. The FARS model
The cells of area F5 of the macaque inferior premotor
cortex are often selective for the type of grasp made by
the monkey (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Grasps observed during
these experiments include precision pinches (using the tips
of the index finger and thumb), lateral pinches (thumb
against the side of the index finger), and power grasps
(four fingers opposing the palm). In addition, the firing of
these cells typically correlated with a particular phase of the
ongoing movement.
F5 exchanges cortico-cortical connections with the ante-
rior intra-parietal area of parietal cortex (AIP), whose cells
demonstrate a variety of both visual- and grasp-related
responses (Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata,
1990).
The FARS model of the grasping process (Fagg & Arbib,
1998) focuses on the roles of several areas, especially the
interactions of F5 and AIP, but also their relationship with
pre-SMA (F6), F2 (dorsal premotor cortex), and the basal
ganglia (BG).
3.1.1. A brief model overview
The crucial aspects of the model (see Fig. 1) are the
following:
1. AIP serves the dual role of first computing a set of affor-
dances for the object being attended (i.e. AIP highlights
properties of the object relevant for physically interacting
with it), and then maintaining an active memory of the
selected affordance as the corresponding grasp is
prepared and executed.
2. F5 integrates a variety of constraints to decide on the
single grasp that is to be executed. These constraints
include visual information (from the affordances
extracted by AIP), task information (from pre-SMA,
F6), instruction stimuli (from dorsal premotor cortex,
F2), and a working memory of recently executed grasps.
When the movement is triggered, F5 is responsible for
the high-level execution and subsequent monitoring of
the planned preshape and grasp.
3. As indicated in Fig. 2, F6 (pre-SMA) represents the high-
level execution of the sequence, while phase transitions
dictated by the sequence are managed by the basal gang-
lia (BG). For a task (“the Sakata protocol”) in which the
monkey was presented with an object, then grasped the
object in response to a go signal, held the object, and
finally released the object after a secondary go signal,
the following phases in F5 activity were influenced by
BG control mechanisms: preparatory (set), finger exten-
sion, finger flexion, holding, and release.
4. Fagg and Arbib (1998) offered both a computational
analysis and an analysis of empirical data in support of
the hypothesis that not only is F5 responsible for unfold-
ing (with BG supervision) the grasp in time during the
execution of the movement, but that F5 also sends recur-
rent connections back to AIP to update AIP’s active
memory for the grasp that is about to be executed or
that is being executed by F5.
3.1.2. Control of conditional behavior
The many details of the FARS model (Fagg & Arbib,
1998) are beyond the scope of the present review. Here
we focus on its performance in a conditional task in
which the grasp is not known prior to a given trial, and is
only determined by an arbitrary instruction stimulus (IS)
made available during the course of the trial (e.g. an LED
whose color indicates one of two grasps). The dorsal premo-
tor cortex (F2) is thought to be responsible for the associa-
tion of arbitrary IS with the preparation of motor programs
(Mitz, Godshalk, & Wise, 1991; see Fagg & Arbib, 1992 for
a related model). In the FARS model, then, F5 combines the
view of the object (with its multiple affordances signaled by
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Fig. 1. According to the FARS model, AIP uses visual input to extract
affordances, which highlight the features of the object that are relevant to
grasping it. F5 then applies various constraints to select a grasp for execu-
tion and to inform AIP of the status of its execution, thus updating AIP’s
active memory. The areas shown are AIP (anterior intraparietal cortex),
area F5 (of the ventral premotor cortex), and regions providing supporting
input to F5, namely F6 (pre-SMA), area 46 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex),
and F2 (dorsal premotor cortex).
AIP) with the instruction stimulus (F2) to specify which
grasp is to be executed.
Fig. 2 presents a schematic view of the model’s architec-
ture. Arrows indicate excitatory connections between
regions; filled circles indicate inhibitory connections. The
dorsal premotor cortex (F2) biases the selection of grasp to
execute as a function of the presented instruction stimulus.
The precision pinch and power grasp pools in F5 and AIP
are connected through recurrent excitatory connections.
Since Rizzolatti noted that more F5 neurons are related to
the precision pinch than to other grasps, the precision pinch
pool in the FARS model contains more neurons than other
grasp pools. Arbib et al. (2000) show how this affects the
Synthetic PET measure in these and downstream regions,
and discuss the implication of these results for reconciling
the FARS model with actual PET studies of rCBF in
comparing the precision pinch task against the power
grasp task. However, in what follows we concentrate on
the comparison of a conditional with a non-conditional task.
3.2. Synthetic PET results
Arbib et al. (2000) conducted two different Synthetic PET
experiments, providing predictions for what we expect
when the experiments are performed in the human. In
both experiments, the modeled subject is asked to grasp a
single object using one of two grasps. In the first experi-
ment, we examined (i) the effects of knowing which grasp to
use prior to the onset of recording (non-conditional task),
and (ii) only being told which grasp to use after a delay
period (conditional task). In the latter task, an instruction
stimulus in the form of a bi-colored LED informs the subject
which grasp should be used. Here we summarize the
comparison of conditional and non-conditional tasks.
The most significant predicted change was the level of
activity exhibited by area F2 (dorsal premotor cortex). Its
high level of activity in the conditional task is due to the fact
that this region is only involved when the model must map
an arbitrary stimulus to a motor program. In the non-condi-
tional task, the region does not receive IS inputs, and thus its
synaptic activity is dominated by the general background
activity in the region.
The additional IS inputs in the conditional task have a
second-order effect on the network, yielding small changes
in synaptic activity in F5, BG, and AIP (see Arbib et al.,
2000 for details). Increased synaptic activity in F5 is due to
the additional positive inputs from F2. These inputs also
cause an increase in the region’s activity level, which is
passed on through excitatory connections to both AIP and
BG (recall Fig. 2).
It is important to recall that synaptic activity does not
have the same meaning as neural activity. This can be
seen by examining the definition of wB!A(t) (see Eq. (2)).
The absolute value of the synaptic strength contributes posi-
tively to this measure — so increases in either positive or
negative signals into a region will be reflected as an increase
in synaptic activity. Neural activity, on the other hand,
depends monotonically on the synaptic strength: increases
in positive signals result in increases in neural activity,
whereas increases in negative signals result in decreases
of activation. An important ability of the Synthetic PET
technique is that the positive and negative contributions to
the Synthetic PET measure can be differentiated in the simu-
lation. This information, combined with knowledge of the
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Fig. 2. Another view of FARS model architecture. Arrows indicate excitatory connections between regions; filled circles indicate inhibitory connections. The
precision pinch and power grasp pools in F5 and AIP are connected through recurrent excitatory connections. The precision pinch pool contains more neurons
than other grasps. The dorsal premotor cortex (F2) biases the selection of grasp to execute as a function of the presented instruction stimulus.
gross anatomy (especially the sign of connections between
regions), can aid in inferring changes in neural activity
across tasks. Although the positive contributions to F5 and
AIP essentially dominate the full PET measure, we also saw
small increases in the negative inputs into these regions.
These inhibitory signals are due to negative inputs from
local recurrent connections in the respective areas (in the
case of F5, BG also contributes additional negative inputs).
This serves as additional evidence that both F5 and AIP
experience increases in their overall neural activity.
3.3. Human brain imaging
To provide human PET data relevant to the above
Synthetic PET predictions, Grafton et al. (1998) asked
subjects to repeatedly perform grasping movements over a
90-s scanning period. The targets for grasping were located
at three stations mounted on an experimental apparatus,
with each station consisting of both a rectangular block
that could be grasped using a power grasp, and a pair of
plates (mounted in a groove on the side of the block), which
could be grasped using a precision pinch (thumb and index
finger). A force sensitive resistive (FSR) material, mounted
on the front and back of the block, detected when a solid
power grasp had been established. The pinch plates were
attached to a pair of mechanical micro-switches which
detected when a successful precision pinch had been
executed. For each station, the block and plates were
mounted such that the subject could grasp either one without
requiring a change in wrist orientation. A bi-colored LED at
each station was used to instruct the subject as to the next
target of movement. A successful grasp of this next target
was indicated to the subject by a change in the color of the
LED. The subject then held the grasp position until the next
target was given. Targets were presented every 3 ^ 0.1 s.
Four different scanning conditions were repeated three
times each. In the first, subjects repeatedly performed a
power grasp to the indicated block. The target block was
identified by the turning on of the associated LED (green in
color). When the subject grasped the block, the color of the
LED changed from green to red. For the second condition, a
precision pinch was used. The target was identified in the
same manner as the first condition. In the third grasping
condition (conditional task), the initial color of the LED
instructed the subject to use either a precision pinch
(green) or a power grasp (red). When contact was estab-
lished, the LED changed to the opposite color. In the fourth
(control) condition, the subjects were instructed to simply
fixate on the currently lit LED, and not make movements of
the arm or hand (prior to the scan, the arm was placed in a
relaxed position). The lit LED changed from one position to
another at the same rate and variability as in the grasping
tasks. Prior to scanning, subjects were allowed to practice
the tasks for several minutes. Grafton et al. (1998) provide
results for Grasp versus Rest, Precision versus Power Grasp,
Conditional versus Non-Conditional Grasp. Here we present
only the third case:
Fig. 3 reflects differences of conditional grasp selection
(power or precision based on color cues) as compared to an
average of the fixed grasping conditions (power and preci-
sion tasks): Cond 2 (Power 1 Precision)/2. The upper
arrow indicates a large area of significance in the left super-
ior frontal sulcus corresponding to the dorsal premotor
cortex. As noted earlier, this region in monkey is thought
to be involved in the arbitrary association of stimuli with the
preparation of motor programs. The lower arrow indicates
increased CBF in the left inferior parietal lobule and intra-
parietal sulcus. Because this comparison is counterbalanced
for the amount of movement made during execution of the
tasks, there is no difference observed in the motor execution
areas.
3.4. Comparison of PET and synthetic PET
The model predicts that the conditional task should yield
much higher activation in F2 (dorsal premotor cortex), some
activation of F5, and a slight activation of AIP. The human
experiment confirmed the F2 result, but failed to confirm the
predictions for F5. Furthermore, in human we see an activa-
tion of the inferior parietal cortex, along the intra-parietal
sulcus, which is perhaps an AIP homologue.
Can we make use of the negative F5 result to further
refine the model? Consider the functional connectivity of
these regions in the model (Fig. 4, left). In the model, the
strength of the projection from F2 to F5 is essentially a free
parameter. In other words, there is a wide range of values
over which the model will correctly perform the conditional
and non-conditional tasks. The implication is that, by tuning
this parameter, we can control this projection’s contribution
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Fig. 3. Left hemisphere localization of task related effects. PET statistical
comparisons of the pooled data across subjects (in red, P , 0:005) are
superimposed on a single subject’s MRI scan centered in the same coordi-
nate space. The view is left superior oblique, and denotes differences
between conditional grasp selection versus fixed grasping.
to the synaptic activity measure in F5. However, the differ-
ence in AIP synaptic activity from the non-conditional to the
conditional task will always be less than the difference
observed in F5. Why is this the case? By increasing the
projection strength from F2 to F5, we observe an increase
in both F5 synaptic and cell activity. The increase in F5 cell
activity, however, is attenuated by local, recurrent inhibi-
tory connections. Thus the excitation that is then passed on
to AIP via F5 does not reflect the full magnitude of the
signal received from F2.
The conclusion is that, although we can adjust the free
parameter to match one or the other observations in the
human experiment (of either F5 or AIP changes), the
model cannot reflect both at the same time. One possibility
for repairing this problem in the model is to reroute the F2
information so that it enters the grasp decision circuitry
through AIP (or both AIP and F5), rather than exclusively
through F5 (Fig. 4, left). This would yield an increase in
activity in AIP due to F2 activation with only an attenuated
signal being passed on to F5, resulting in only a small
increase in F5 synaptic activity. Note that we do not neces-
sarily assume that there exists a direct cortico-cortical
connection from F2 to AIP or F5, but only that there is a
functional connection (which potentially involves multiple
synapses).
The low-level details of the FARS grasping model (Fagg
& Arbib, 1998) were derived primarily from neurophysio-
logical results obtained in monkey. The synthetic PET
approach extracts measures of regional synaptic activity as
the model performs a variety of tasks. These measures are
then compared to rCBF (regional cerebral blood flow)
observed during human PET experiments as the subjects
perform tasks similar to those simulated in the model. In
some cases, the human results provide confirmation of the
model behavior. In other cases, where there is a mismatch
between model prediction and human results, it is possible
(as we have shown) to use these negative results to further
refine and constrain the model and, on this basis, design new
experiments for both primate neurophysiology and human
brain imaging (see Arbib et al., 2000 for further details).
4. The mirror system and imitation
As a background for our second case study on Synthetic
Brain imaging, on Imitation and (Synthetic) fMRI in
Section 5, we now review data on the mirror neuron system
for grasping in the monkey brain, and then discuss its impli-
cations for the study of imitation in humans. We shall briefly
discuss the relevance of mirror systems and imitation for the
evolution of language in Section 6.3.
4.1. The monkey mirror system for grasping
In Section 3.1, we saw that cells of area F5 of inferior
premotor cortex of the macaque are often selective for the
type of grasp made by the monkey (Rizzolatti et al., 1988),
while the anterior intra-parietal area of parietal cortex (AIP)
has cells demonstrating a variety of both visual- and grasp-
related responses (Taira et al., 1990). Here we extend the F5
database by noting the discovery by Gallese, Fadiga,
Fogassi, and Rizzolatti (1996) and Rizzolatti, Fadiga,
Gallese, and Fogassi (1996) of a subset of F5 grasp cells
which they called mirror neurons. Like other F5 neurons,
mirror neurons are active when the monkey performs a
particular class of actions. However, in addition the mirror
neurons become active when the monkey observes the
experimenter or another monkey performing an action. In
most of the mirror neurons, there is a clear relation between
the coded observed and executed action. The actions studied
so far include grasping, manipulating and placing. The
congruence between the observed and executed action
varies. For some of the mirror neurons, the congruence is
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Fig. 4. Previous functional model (left; compare Fig. 2) and updated functional model (right). In the revised model, the information from F2 flows (primarily)
into the circuit through a projection into AIP.
quite loose; for others, not only must the general action (e.g.
grasping) match but also the way the action is executed (e.g.
power grasp) must match as well. To be triggered the mirror
neurons require an interaction between the experimenter
and the object. The sight of the experimenter or the object
alone does not trigger mirror activity.
Fig. 5 demonstrates the dual response property of mirror
neurons. The recorded neuron in the figure is silent during
the presentation of the object, but starts firing when the
experimenter picks up the object. The neuron interestingly
does not fire during the time the tray is moved towards the
monkey (the monkey knows that he is going to pick up the
object) and finally it starts firing again when the monkey,
himself, picks up the object. A range of congruence (the
degree of strictness of the match between the action
observed and the executed action) is found in mirror
neurons. The most congruent responses require the observed
action and the executed action to use the same grasp type.
Fogassi, Gallese, Fadiga, and Rizzolatti (1998) find that F5
is not the only area that has mirror neurons. The rostral part of
the inferior parietal lobule of the macaque monkey (area 7b or
PF) also has neurons with similar mirror properties.
Recent human PET studies indicate that a similar mirror
neuron system exists in the human brain. Grafton, Arbib,
Fadiga, and Rizzolatti (1996a) scanned subjects under three
conditions: object viewing (the control condition), obser-
ving a precision grasping of common objects, and imagining
themselves doing the same grasp. The imagined minus
control and observation minus control results were
compared. Differences were seen in both lateral activations
and medial/dorsal activations. In the observation minus
control condition, activity locations were left STS (the
cortex of superior temporal sulcus), left inferior frontal
area 45, and the left parietal area 40. Also there was some
activation found in the rostral part of the left intraparietal
sulcus. Grafton et al. pointed out that the location of the
activated sites during grasping observation in humans corre-
sponds rather well to that of monkey cortical areas contain-
ing neurons that selectively discharge during hand action
observation. Finally they conclude that in monkeys and
humans a similar cortical circuit is involved in representing
observed grasping. Unfortunately we cannot be sure that the
activities are due to mirror neuron system since there is no
convincing study showing that the same regions get acti-
vated selectively for self executed grasps (Grafton, Fagg,
Woods, & Arbib, 1996).
4.2. Imitation in humans
Imitation is a complex behavior requiring the integration
of a multitude of sensory stimuli and of a variety of move-
ments. This integration process is affected by attentional,
emotional, social, and environmental factors. All these
factors modulate learning by imitation. Still, some funda-
mental principles of learning by imitation can be extrapo-
lated by the investigation of its neural mechanisms. These
principles can be used to define the mental representations
underlying learning by imitation in neural, computational,
psychological, and social terms.
In spite of the complexity of imitative behavior, there are
data (still somewhat controversial) supporting the claim that
even soon after birth human infants can imitate facial and
some manual gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). However,
it is important to stress that there may be different mirror
mechanisms for different acts, and that imitation for grasp-
ing requires months to develop. Smiling is probably an
innate releasing mechanism for smiling (whether the infant
smiles at the parent or the parent smiles at the infant)
depending, like laughing and weeping, on “built-in” circui-
try. We distinguish this from building a novel repertoire and
then building further to assemblages of variations.
Our hypothesis is that an appropriate mirror system
(observation/execution matching system) orchestrates the
various components involved in the sensorimotor transfor-
mations required by imitation of behaviors more complex
than smiling, laughing and weeping. More complex beha-
viors are not simply learned and replicated as unified non-
decomposed patterns. In terms of neural control, the brain
generates internal models (neural mechanisms that can
mimic the input–output characteristics of the learning
system: Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992; Wolpert, Ghahramani,
& Jordan, 1995). To learn, a system must be able to general-
ize beyond the set of sensory stimuli and movements that
has been experienced in the past. This is possible only
through the internal representation of sensory consequences
of motor commands (the forward model) or, inversely,
through the extrapolation of motor commands from the
observation of motor behavior (the inverse model).
The representation of action supported by mirror neurons
seems to be more a representation of action goals than of
motor outputs (Arbib & Rizzolatti, 1997). We must thus
seek to establish how these goals may be combined to form
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Fig. 5. Activity of a cell during action observation (left) and action execu-
tion (right). There is no activity during either initial presentation of the
object or as the tray is brought towards the monkey (from Gallese et al.,
1996).
a repertoire of purposeful and adaptive behavior. Moreover,
action goals are hierarchically organized in human imitative
behavior. Studies on imitation in children show that pre-
schoolers represent the most salient goal of the action to be
imitated, but often ignore lower goals (Bekkering, Wohlschal-
ger, & Gattis, 2000) (incidentally, this is the same behavior of
patients with aphasia, Head, 1920; supporting the possible
links between imitation and language to be taken up briefly
in Section 6.3). Goals are easily embodied by objects (Mary
grasps a cup). Thus, the role of objects in action observation
and learning by imitation seems to be a crucial one and needs
to be clarified.
In Section 5.1, we present the results of an fMRI study of
an imitation task that involves a subject observing a very
simple finger movement and responding with a movement
which in its entirety is already in the subject’s own reper-
toire. Skill acquisition more generally (consider, for exam-
ple, learning a new dance), however, rests on a far more
complex form of imitation that involves “parsing” a
complex movement into more or less familiar pieces, and
then performing the corresponding composite of (variations
on) familiar actions. Note the insistence on “more or less
familiar pieces” and “variations”. Elsewhere, we (Arbib,
1981) have introduced the notion of a coordinated control
program, to show how a new behavior could be composed
from an available repertoire of perceptual and motor sche-
mas (the execution of a successful action will in general
require perceptual constraints on the relevant movements).
However, skill acquisition not only involves the formation
of new schemas as composites of old ones, it also involves
the tuning of these schemas to match a new set of condi-
tions, to the point that the unity of the new schema may
over-ride the original identity of the components. For exam-
ple, if one is acquiring a tennis stroke and a badminton
stroke through imitation, the initial coordinated control
program may be identical, yet in the end the very different
dynamics of the tennis ball and shuttlecock lead to divergent
schemas. Conversely, a skill may require attention to details
not handled by the constituent schemas of the preliminary
coordinated control program. Fractionation may be
required, as when the infant progresses from “swiping
grasps” at objects to the differentiation of separate schemas
for the control of arm and hand movements. Later, the hand
movement repertoire becomes expanded as one acquires
such novel skills as typing or piano playing, with this exten-
sion matched by increased subtlety of eye–arm–hand coor-
dination. Thus we have three mechanisms (at least) to learn
completely new actions: forming new constructs (coordi-
nated control programs) based on familiar actions; tuning
of these constructs to yield new encapsulated actions, and
fractionation of existing actions to yield more adaptive
actions as tuned, coordinated control programs of novel
schemas.
However, the study of imitation mechanisms based on the
building up and/or the fractionation of coordinated control
programs is a task for the future. Instead, Section 5.1 will
present fMRI data on human imitation of simple finger
movements, while Section 5.2 will offer a preliminary
global model of imitation based on the joint-by-joint repro-
duction of an observed movement which Section 5.3 will
build upon to provide a Synthetic fMRI study of grasping
and finger tapping.
5. Imitation and (synthetic) fMRI
5.1. An fMRI study of “simple” imitation
In a recent study of “simple” imitation in humans (Iaco-
boni et al., 1999), we compared fMRI activity during imita-
tion with fMRI activity during two control tasks in which
subjects were required to perform the same finger move-
ments as in the imitation task, but in response to symbolic
or spatial cues. We reasoned that if some human brain areas
had mirror properties during imitation, then these areas
should become active during action execution regardless
of how the action was elicited, and should also become
more active during imitation. This is because the action to
be performed was also observed and so a brain area with
mirror properties would be simultaneously activated by the
motor command to be executed and by the visual input
representing the observed action. Moreover, these areas
should become active during action observation compared
to rest.
Fig. 6 shows a comprehensive view of activated areas
during imitation versus rest in this experiment. Among
these activated areas, we found two areas with mirror prop-
erties, i.e. they were simultaneously activated by the motor
command to be executed and by the visual input represent-
ing the observed action. One was located in the inferior
frontal cortex of the left hemisphere and corresponded to
Brodmann area 44 (Broca’s area). The other was located in
the rostral part of the posterior parietal cortex in the right
hemisphere (area PE/PC). We proposed that the left inferior
frontal cortex (area 44) describes the observed action in
terms of its motor goal, whereas the right posterior parietal
area (PE/PC) codes the precise kinesthetic aspect of the
movement (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Note, however, that the
lateralization of the activations is rather relative. In fact,
when statistical thresholds are lowered, bilateral activations
are observed in both inferior frontal and posterior parietal
cortices.
The demonstration of mirror properties in Broca’s area
during imitation is in support of the hypothesis that
language evolved from a basic mechanism not originally
related to communication: the mirror system with its ability
to generate and recognize actions (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998;
see also Section 6.3).
We also observed mirror properties in the activity of an
area located in STS. The activity in this region did not reach
full significance after correction for multiple comparisons
and was not reported in the original paper. However, there
M.A. Arbib et al. / Neural Networks 13 (2000) 975–997 985
are two reasons to believe that this area is likely to belong to
the human mirror system. First of all, we have subsequently
observed similar mirror properties in a follow-up experi-
ment in the same region. Fig. 7 shows the activity of this
region in both experiments, for identical tasks. Second, in
two PET experiments (Grafton, Arbib et al., 1996;
Rizzolatti et al., 1996) subjects observed the experimenter
grasping a three-dimensional object. Grasp observation
significantly activated the STS. Neurons that become selec-
tively active in the STS during the sight of moving hands
and faces but not of moving objects were also described in
single unit studies.
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Fig. 6. Cortical and subcortical activations during imitation versus rest. Within these areas, some (inferior frontal cortex, anterior part of the posterior parietal
cortex, and STS) had activity that is characteristic of areas with mirror properties.
The mirror area in STS is more posterior than the STS
region found active in previous studies of action observation
in humans and in macaques. (See Section 6.1 for further
discussion of data on STS.) It is possible that the STS
region, a region critical for the understanding of social
signals, is constituted of a rostral sector with sensory proper-
ties only and a caudal sector with mirror properties. It has
been proposed that the anterior STS neurons that are acti-
vated by the sight of moving hands and faces analyze the
actions of others. This anterior ‘sensory-only’ STS region
may feed into the more posterior “mirror” STS region
during imitation. The anterior STS region would provide a
visual analysis of the actions of others, whereas the more
posterior STS regions would provide a first level of match-
ing between observation and execution. The other two
mirror areas described in our paper would describe the
observed action in terms of its motor goal (Brodmann
Area 44), and would code the precise kinesthetic aspect of
the movement (PE/PC). It is possible that each of these other
mirror areas has a dedicated cortical area for preprocessing
of the action to be imitated during action observation. In
fact, in our fMRI experiment on imitation we did observe
greater activation for action observation than for observa-
tion of the symbolic or spatial cues in two areas, one in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (that would feed into Brod-
mann Area 44) and one in the caudalmost part of the intra-
parietal sulcus (that would feed into PE/PC).
We saw (Section 4.1) that mirror neurons are found in the
macaque brain for object-oriented grasping actions and
show a narrow tuning with respect to the type of object
and the way it is treated but quite a broad tuning for the
trajectory of the movement or the motor effector involved
(Gallese et al., 1996). In our fMRI study we used an intran-
sitive action, and no objects were involved. The presence of
real objects, however, alters the motor component of the
task and makes it more difficult to interpret imaging data.
However, dots or marks on a table can be used as end-points
of imitated actions. These dots or marks are known to alter
the imitative behavior of preschoolers and adults. In a recent
study, the experimenter initiated hand movements to one of
two dots on a table and asked children to imitate his actions.
In another condition the same movements were performed
and were imitated, except that this time the movements were
directed to the same places on the table but no dots were
visible. In the latter condition children imitated well the
movements of the experimenter, including their laterality,
whereas when dots were visible children would often reach
for the correct dot with the incorrect hand (Bekkering et al.,
2000). This is because when observing object-oriented
actions, the object activates a ‘direct’ motor program; i.e.
a motor program that leads most directly to the effect the
action has on the object, like grasping, pointing, covering,
etc. Without objects, the relative positions of the fingers
become the goal of the action. These goals also call the
‘direct’ motor program, but now the ‘direct’ motor program
is matching the observed non-object oriented action. This
predicts that goal-oriented areas, such as Broca’s area,
should be more active during the imitation of object-
oriented actions than during the imitation of non-object-
oriented movements. The reasoning is that if Broca’s area
is the homologue of the monkeys mirror neuron system
(tuned for object-oriented actions), then Broca’s area should
also be better tuned for object-oriented actions. For the
parietal area PE/PC we might expect that the visible
presence of goals would not modulate its activity and thus
goal-oriented actions and intransitive actions to be imitated
will activate this region similarly. Preliminary data from
ongoing fMRI experiments performed in the Iacoboni
laboratory seem consistent with these predictions.
Taken together, these data suggest a first draft of an infor-
mation processing model of human imitation according to
which the early “description” of the action is performed in
STS. From this region, inputs would be transferred to the
posterior parietal cortex for precise coding of the kines-
thetics of the action. This region would in turn send infor-
mation to Broca’s area for defining the goal of the action.
Information would be recursively shuffled among these
areas for a tight coupling of these three ‘levels’ of
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Fig. 7. Activity in STS showing mirror properties. This activity was observed in two separate experiments comprising 12 subjects in the first experiment and 10
different subjects in the second experiment. I: imitation; MC: motor control; AO: action observation; OC: observation control.
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Fig. 8. The global imitation model consists of three parts for visual recognition, motor control and learning and is composed of biologically inspired modules, namely the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the
spinal cord, the primary motor cortex (M1), the dorsal premotor area (PMd) and the cerebellum.
information processing, i.e. motion recognition, kines-
thetics, and goal-orientation. In Section 6.1 we outline the
structure of a model which develops some of these ideas on
the basis of neurophysiological data. However, the present
article emphasizes a “global” model (Section 5.2) based on
a high-level view of a few large brain regions, each modeled
connectionistically without attempting to address details of
neurophysiology. We then offer (Section 5.3) a Synthetic
fMRI analysis of the model. The integration of these two
complementary models, and the development there from for
a model of complex imitation based on coordinated control
programs, is a goal for future research.
5.2. Imitation: a global model
Our Global Imitation Model (Fig. 8) is a preliminary
model of primate imitative ability (Billard, 2000). Our
aim was to build a comprehensive, but simplified model
of the visuo-motor pathway behind learning by imitation,
from processing real video data to directing a complete
dynamic simulation of a humanoid.
This model is biologically inspired in its function, as its
composite modules have functionalities similar to that of
specific brain regions, but the modules are composed of
artificial neural networks whose neurons are little
constrained by biological data. It is loosely based on neuro-
logical findings in primates and incorporates abstract
models of some brain areas involved in visuo-motor control,
namely STS, the spinal cord, the primary motor cortex
(M1), the dorsal premotor area (PMd) and the cerebellum.
The model is implemented in a dynamic simulation of a 65
degrees of freedom avatar which allows us to approximate
the motions of a humanoid.
The STS module takes as input the Cartesian coordinates
of each joint of the demonstrator’s limbs in an exocentric
frame of reference. It then transforms these coordinates to a
new set of coordinates relative to an egocentric frame of
reference. Our assumption of the existence of orientation-
sensitive cells in an egocentric frame of reference in STS is
sustained by neurological evidence in monkeys (Perrett,
Harries, Mistlin, & Chitty, 1989; Perrett, Harries, Bevan
et al., 1989) and humans (Andersen, Lawrence, Bradley,
& Xing, 1997; Kertzman, Schwarz, Zeffiro, & Hallett,
1997; Vallar et al., 1999). The vision system also incorpo-
rates a simplified attentional mechanism which triggers
whenever a significant change of position (relative to the
position at the previous time step) in one of the limbs is
observed. Note that, at this stage of the modeling and given
the simplicity of this module, the attentional module does
not relate to any specific brain area. The attentional mechan-
ism creates an inhibition, preventing information flow from
M1 to PMd and further to the cerebellum, thereby allowing
learning of new movements only when a change in the limb
position is observed. In previous experiments, we used
video recording of human motion to drive the imitation
experiments, see Billard (2000).
Motor control in our model is hierarchical with, at the
lowest level, the spinal cord module, composed of primary
neural circuits (central pattern generators (CPGs); Stein,
Grillner, Selverston, & Stuart, 1997), made of motor
neurons and interneurons. The structure of the CPGs is
strongly inspired by Ijspeert’s model of vertebrate spinal
circuits (Ijspeert, Hallam, & Willshaw, 1999), and encode
simple rhythmic movements of arm and legs for open-loop
walking, as well as primary motor behaviors, such as
retracting and stretch arm movements of the humanoid
avatar. The motor neurons in our simulation activate the
avatar’s muscles. We model two muscles per degree of free-
dom per joint. Each muscle is represented as a spring and a
damper (Lacquaniti & Soechting, 1986).
The M1 module monitors the activation of the spinal
networks. Nodes in M1 are distributed following a topo-
graphic map of the body. Learning of movements is done
in the PMd and cerebellum modules. These modules are
implemented using the Dynamical Recurrent Associative
Memory Architecture (DRAMA) (Billard & Hayes, 1999)
which allows learning of times series and of spatio-temporal
invariants in multi-modal inputs. Finally, the decision
module controls the passage between observing and repro-
ducing the motor sequences, i.e. it inhibits PMd neural
activity due to STS (visual) input to flow downwards to
M1 (for motor activation). It is implemented as a set of
if–then rules and has no direct biological inspiration.
Neurons in the PMd module respond to both visual infor-
mation (from STS) and to corresponding motor commands
produced by the cerebellum. The STS–PMd–M1 intercon-
nection is a simplified version of the mirror neuron model
described in Section 6.1.
Each submodule of the model is implemented at a
connectionist level. In the spinal cord module, we use
Eq. (1) to model each neuron unit as a leaky integrator,
whereas in the M1, PMd and cerebellum modules, we
follow the DRAMA neural architecture (see Billard &
Hayes, 1999 for a complete description). This differs from
the Hopfield network in several ways, especially in its
different topology, training and retrieval rules. Each connec-
tion of the network is associated not only with a weight (as
usual) but also time parameter. Both are updated during
learning. The time parameters represent the decay of neural
activity along the synapses, while the weights keep a
memory of the frequency of neural activation (weights are
increased following classical Hebbian rules, i.e. whenever
two neurons are simultaneously co-activated). The DRAMA
network provides a general ability for learning complex
time series by recording explicitly the temporal and spatial
aspect of the patterns in its two different sets of connection
parameters.
5.3. Synthetic fMRI for grasping and finger tapping
We present here two synthetic fMRI experiments on
imitation of grasping and finger tapping movements. The
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second experiment was meant to reproduce the fMRI
experiment described in Section 5.1 on human imitation
of an index finger tapping task. We use a pair of demonstra-
tor and imitator avatars. In the grasping experiment, the
demonstrator avatar moves its right arm from rest position
(alongside its body) to reaching a horizontal and frontal
position with all fingers closed in a strong grasp. The finger
tapping experiments consists of having the demonstrator
lifting upwards four times its index finger. This experiments
starts with the avatar’s right arm lifted in the horizontal,
frontal position, all fingers relaxed.
During each demonstration, the imitator avatar processes,
in the STS module, the simulated Cartesian coordinates of
the demonstrator’s limbs and learns the demonstrated
motion by processing the information upwards to the PMd
and cerebellum modules. Once the demonstration is
finished, the imitator avatar is allowed to reproduce the
sequence of movements by reactivating the node in the
cerebellum which had first been activated during the demon-
stration. This automatically leads to sequential reactivation
of the other relevant nodes in the Cerebellum and PMd
modules. The PMd activity projects downwards to M1
and spinal cord to activate the imitator’s muscles. Fig. 9
shows the activity in cerebellum and PMd modules during
observation and imitation.
Computing synthetic fMRI as with our equation for
Synthetic PET (Eqs. (2) and (3)) we calculated the raw
fMRI activity (fMRIA) of the cerebellum, PMd, M1 and
STS modules during observation and imitation tasks.
Table 1 shows the raw values for cerebellum and PMd for
the two experiments. Data on synthetic grasping are predic-
tive, and could be compared to future fMRI experiments. In
the following, we compare synthetic data on finger tapping
to the fMRI experiment described in the previous section.
Fig. 10 shows the ratio of activity of the four regions for
real and synthetic fMRI data during the finger tapping task.
The error bars on the real fMRI data are the standard devia-
tion calculated across the 12 subjects and the four trials (per
subject). In both our model and the real data, M1 has the
biggest activity. The ratio of activity across the four regions
in our model is comprised within the error margin (or close
to it, as it is the case for STS). This qualitative similarity of
the model to the data is obtained by adjusting the number of
connections across modules and the encoding (the number
of nodes active) in each module.
Fig. 10 shows the comparative fMRI activity of the cere-
bellum and PMd modules (those are the only modules acti-
vated during both tasks) for imitation against observation
tasks in the finger tapping experiment. This is compared to
the real fMRI activity of the same regions as measured by
Iacoboni et al. (1999). The reason why the ratio in simula-
tion is not equal to one, even though the same nodes in
cerebellum and PMd are activated in both tasks, is due to
the fact that each node stays at the maximum of activity
slightly longer in the retrieving/imitation task than during
the observation. This is an artifact due to the neural activa-
tion function in the DRAMA architecture which allows for
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Fig. 9. Neural activity in cerebellum and PMd modules during observation and imitation.
Table 1
Raw data of synthetic fMRI for imitation of grasping and finger tapping
Grasp Finger tapping
Cerebellum 0.75 0.64
PMd 0.77 0.75
an imprecision in the timing of the retrieval of the neural
activation (Billard & Hayes, 1999). This effect can be
observed in Fig. 11, where one sees that the neural activity
in cerebellum and PMd during imitation follows a small
plateau at the maximum of activity before decaying,
which it does not do during observation. This artifact is
meant to compensate for random noise in the visual input
during learning. In short, our model assumes an equal (plus
a random error) activity between observation and imitation
in cerebellum and PMd modules.
The synthetic activity returned consistently lower ratios
than the fMRI data. This may be due to two factors. First, as
we noted in Section 2.2, BOLD fMRI is probably affected
by both blood flow and blood volume changes (Hess et al.,
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Fig. 10. Ratio of synthetic and real fMRI activity in cerebellum, PMd, and STS against that of M1.
Fig. 11. Ratio of synthetic and real fMRI activity in cerebellum and PMd, observation against imitation task.
2000). The model does not explicitly account for blood
volume effects, given that these effects are not closely
linked to neural activity. Second, empirical data on MT
neurons have suggested that the neuronal population activ-
ity may be mainly driven by low firing rate neurons the
activity of which is unaffected by the task or the stimulus
(Scannell & Young, 1999). Thus, task-related changes in
neural activity may result in small changes in the overall
neuronal population activity, determining smaller changes
in BOLD signal, compared to expected values based on
theoretical considerations or single-unit data. Both factors
may conjointly contribute to higher ratios for fMRI data
than for synthetic data. The point is not to claim that we
have achieved the final model of imitation, but rather to
highlight the importance of being able to use multiple
sources of data in validating a model, and the utility of
Synthetic fMRI in bringing human brain imaging to bear
in developing a model of “the supporting neural networks”.
Section 6 discusses further issues in developing the research
program exemplified in the present article.
6. The many facets of global modeling
6.1. Modeling the mirror system
As is clear from Fig. 6, brain imaging implicates a large
number of brain regions in even apparently simple tasks,
and we have discussed only a few of the regions in Fig. 6
explicitly in this article. In view of this, we quickly review
several studies from the Arbiblaboratory (of course the work
of many other laboratories could have been marshaled to
make the same point) to indicate the immense challenges in
integrating models of different portions of the nervous
system which address detailed neurophysiological data
from studies of primates and other species. Such studies
are necessary to complement the high-level views of
human regional brain activity provided by PET and fMRI
studies. We focus on modeling of the Mirror System, then
note (very briefly) the challenges of modeling other systems
relevant to brain activity during imitation, such as the role of
basal ganglia in sequential behavior, and the role of cere-
bellum in the coordination of reach and grasp.
To complement the model of Section 5.2, we offer a high-
level view of a model (Oztop, Rizzolatti, & Arbib, 2000) of
the function and development of the mirror system in terms
of interacting schemas which should be equally applicable
to studies of human and monkey. The schemas to the left of
Fig. 12 implement the visual system of the model. The Hand
shape recognition schema recognizes the hand shape (e.g.
precision grasp) whereas the Hand motion detection schema
locates the hand moving in space and sends related informa-
tion to the Hand–Object spatial relation analysis schema
which also receives object-related signals from the Object
features schema. The Hand–Object spatial relation analy-
sis schema is needed because, in order to elicit mirror
neuron activity in the monkey, seeing the agent and object
is necessary but not sufficient — a hand mimicking a match-
ing grasp would fail to elicit mirror neuron activity unless
the hand’s trajectory were taking it toward an object with a
grasp that matches one of the affordances of the object. The
output of this visual analysis is relayed to the Object affor-
dance–hand state association schema. This, together with
the Action recognition (mirror neurons) schema forms the
M.A. Arbib et al. / Neural Networks 13 (2000) 975–997992
Fig. 12. Schemas of the mirror neuron model with brain regions assigned. The three regions with shared background at right are incorporated from the FARS
model (Oztop et al., 2000).
core mirror (learning) circuit, marked by the gray slanted
rectangle in Fig. 12, which mediates the development of
mirror neurons. Note that the association schema is also
the target of the Hand shape recognition schema as well
as the object affordance signals supplied by the AIP module
of the FARS model. In this way, the association schema
has access to complete (visually observed) hand state
information.
Details of the implementation of these schemas are
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we offer some
preliminary suggestions (also shown in Fig. 12) on the
neural localization of the various schemas.
Object Recognition schema: We follow the usual assump-
tion that this is localized in inferotemporal cortex (IT).
Object features schema: Sakata, Taira, Kusunoki,
Murata, and Tanaka (1997) and Sakata, Taira, Murata
et al. (1997) discovered binocular visual neurons in the
lateral bank of the caudal intraparietal sulcus (cIPS), and
the neighboring area V3a. These neurons respond preferen-
tially to a bar, plate or solid object in a particular orientation
in space. They also found neurons selective for a particular
axis of the objects (AOS neurons) and for particular orienta-
tion of the surfaces (SOS, surface orientation selective
neurons). Such 3D features of the objects are certainly
relevant to a grasp affordance (e.g. axis of object determines
the wrist angle of the hand). We thus localize the Object
features schema in cIPS.
Object affordance extraction schema: Following the
FARS assumption, we localize this in AIP.
Motor program and Action recognition schemas: The F5
neurons of the FARS Motor program (Grasp) schema are
the “canonical” (non-mirror) neurons; while the new Action
recognition schema includes the F5 mirror neurons. F4 is
implicated as coding the target position in the FARS model
and we relate this to the Motor program (Reach) schema,
though we do not yet include this schema in our simulations.
For completeness reasons we included not only area F4, but
cIPS and IT as well (cIPS replaces PIP in the FARS model,
where it was hypothesized that PIP codes object features
upon which AIP can extract affordances, whereas IT
codes the identity of the object being recognized).
Object Location schema: We distribute this between
areas MIP, LIP and VIP. These areas (see Colby & Gold-
berg, 1999 for a review) triple encode the space around the
animal. Although it is hard to assign a single type of encod-
ing to each of these regions a rough separation is possible.
VIP is more concentrated on encoding the ultra-near space
(less than 5 cm from the face); neurons in MIP are specia-
lized for responding to stimuli within reaching distance; and
LIP represents the further space that we explore best with
our eyes rather than our hands.
The Hand shape recognition and Hand motion detection
schemas: We propose that STS implements both schemas.
Perrett, Harries, Benson, Chitty, and Mistlin (1990) and
Perrett, Mistlin, Harries, and Chitty (1990) report neurons
in STS responsive to goal directed hand motion. Some of the
STS area cells show responses to goal directed hand motion
in a translation/scale/rotation invariant way. Andersen,
Asanuma, Essick, and Siegel (1990) show that motion
processing input originating from middle temporal area
(MT) is channeled via medial superior temporal area
(MST) or LIP. MT projects to MST and to other areas in
the parietal cortex concerned with visuospatial function.
Visual input from V1 is further elaborated in MT, where
the firing pattern of neurons reflects the speed and direction
of motion of visual targets. Barnes and Pandya (1992) report
that area 7a (PG-Opt) is reciprocally connected to STS and
suggests that the visuospatial analysis that is associated with
posterior intraparietal lobule (which includes 7a) could be
amplified in the multimodal regions of STS (TPO and Pga).
Therefore, the neurons of multimodal areas of the STS could
be envisioned as being concerned with analyzing the posi-
tion of the organism in relation to the environment (Barnes
& Pandya, 1992).
Object affordance–hand state association schema: We
localize this in area 7b because recent findings on the exis-
tence of mirror and mirror-like neurons in area 7b and
connection of this area with the mirror neuron region of
area F5 (Fogassi et al., 1998) indicates an intimate relation
between 7b and F5 mirror neurons. Anecdotal notes
(Fogassi, personal communication, 1999) indicate that
there exist 7b mirror-like neurons, which fire for simple
arm/hand actions. We propose that PF mirror-like neurons
form the building blocks of F5 mirror neurons. The similar-
ity of STS and 7b responses to active hands, combined with
the connectivity pattern of STS and area 7 makes the STS-
7b circuit suggested in Fig. 12 a plausible approximation to
the primate hand shape-motion recognition circuit.
Hand–Object spatial relation analysis schema: The kind
of computation we are pursuing may be implemented by
multiple regions but, as a speculation, one can propose 7a
as a possible area involved in this computation. Area 7a is
certainly involved in some sort of spatial coding. Stein
(1991) suggests that 7a represent extra-personal space.
Siegel and Read (1997) show 7a neuron involvement in
the analysis of motion evoked during locomotion or by
the manipulation of objects by the hands. Andersen, Shenoy,
Snyder, Bradley, and Crowell (1999) suggests that 7a repre-
sent targets in a world-centered coordinate frame. Finally
Maunsell (1995) suggests an object location coding in 7a,
which is capable of coding the location of objects even
without visual stimuli ever falling into the receptive fields
of some 7a neurons.
For details the core circuit and details of the learning
mechanisms, and especially on the role of the hand state
in linking observation of own-hand to other’s hand, see
Oztop et al. (2000). Our point here is to emphasize how
many brain regions must be considered, and to sample the
wealth of data which must be taken into account to ground
the neural networks which ground a model of the global
brain function involved in mirror activity and imitation,
complementing the high-level model of Section 5.2.
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However, even a model including all the brain regions as
shown in Fig. 12 will be inadequate for at least two reasons:
1. As noted in Section 1.4, high-level schemas may contri-
bute to the motor schemas for many specific actions. It is
thus dangerous to say that specific neurons “encode” an
action when in fact it may take correlated activity in
neurons in a variety of brain regions to “commit” the
brain to the specific action. Similarly, Fig. 12 is too
rigid in assigning schemas to specific regions. However,
modeling must start somewhere, and Fig. 12 provides a
good starting point for the development of more distrib-
uted models.
2. Brain imaging shows activation of areas not included in
Fig. 12, such as the basal ganglia (which were included in
the FARS model) and cerebellum (which was not). We
thus close this section by briefly citing our modeling
efforts on basal ganglia and cerebellum.
We have argued that the basal ganglia may be involved in
assisting cortical planning centers in some fashion as well as
providing sequencing information, and have thus developed
(Bischoff-Grethe, Crowley, & Arbib, 2000) a model which
includes the control of arm movements as well as saccades,
with a recent focus on control of sequences of skeletomotor
actions (Bischoff, 1998; Bischoff-Grethe & Arbib, 2000).
We postulate that the basal ganglia’s direct and indirect
pathways perform two different roles: the indirect pathway
inhibits upcoming motor commands from being performed
while the current movement is in progress, while the direct
pathway projects the next sensory state back to cortex. This
informs supplementary motor area region SMA-proper and
motor cortex of the expected next state and allows these
regions to switch to the next movement of the sequence.
Our models of cerebellar involvement in motor control
hypothesize that where basal ganglia is involved in the phas-
ing in and out of various actions, cerebellum is concerned
with the tuning and coordination of movements. In our
view, the cerebellum does not act directly on the muscles,
but rather acts through Motor Pattern Generators (MPGs)
— circuits which combine, e.g. trajectory or rhythmic
control with local feedback circuitry. We view the cerebel-
lum as divided into microcomplexes. Each microcomplex is
a general computational module which combines a patch of
cerebellar cortex (Purkinje cells and Golgi cell) with the
underlying set of cells in the cerebellar nucleus to which
the Purkinje cells project, and the inferior olive cells whose
climbing fibers provide error signals for motor learning. The
“contextual input” is provided by the parallel fibers, the
granule cell axons which provide a nonlinear combination
of mossy fiber inputs. The job of the Purkinje cells is to learn
to pair the parallel fiber output with a pattern of inhibition of
the nuclear cells so as to ensure that these cells better tune
the MPGs. The parallel fibers are long enough that —
through their shared contextual input — Purkinje cells
may learn not only to tune individual MPGs to changing
circumstances, but also to coordinate multiple MPGs (such
as those for reaching and grasping) so that a complex move-
ment may be achieved in a smooth and integrated way. In
short, we do not hypothesize that the cerebellar microcom-
plex learns to replace the MPG. Rather, we view the cere-
bellum as applying its compensations by modulating MPGs,
whether cortical or subcortical, and this compensation
occurs on multiple time scales. Further, the compensation
patterns can be stored and recalled based on higher level
task information.
A cerebellar model must be tested and developed in
conjunction not only with an MPG model but also with a
“plant model” which contains sufficient complexity to
“challenge” the cerebellum model. Schweighofer, Spoel-
stra, Arbib, and Kawato (1998) and Spoelstra, Arbib, and
Schweighofer (2000) showed how the cerebellum may
compensate for Coriolis forces and other joint interactions
in allowing coordinated control of multiple joints in reach-
ing. In the context of the models of reaching and grasping,
and of mirror neurons and imitation described above, the
problem is to understand how to extend cerebellar modeling
for reaching — and we have shown none of the details here
— to encompass not only the coordination of reach and
grasp in well-learned movements but also to understand
how the cerebellum serves to ensure the graceful coordina-
tion of arm and hand and body “on the fly” when we carry
out a novel behavior, whether in imitation of an observed
behavior or in reacting appropriately to novel circum-
stances.
This quick tour indicates the immense challenges we will
have to face in integrating diverse models of different
portions of the nervous system if Synthetic Brain Imaging
is to reach its full potential in linking models based on
detailed neurophysiology to the high-level views of human
regional brain activity provided by PET and fMRI studies.
6.2. Homologies, brain imaging and neural networks
The fundamental benefit of Synthetic Brain Imaging is
that it allows for specific predictions of PET or fMRI activ-
ity in human brain imaging studies, based on neural network
models of behavior constrained by animal neurophysiology
and arguments from homology. Since the models them-
selves are a product of functional anatomy, measured
single-unit recordings, and behavioral measurements,
Synthetic Brain Imaging provides a powerful bridge
between all of these approaches. An additional strength of
the Synthetic PET implementation is that the contribution of
excitatory and inhibitory influences can be teased apart.
Because synaptic activity is not the same as neural activity,
being able to distinguish excitatory from inhibitory influ-
ences can be an aid to inferring neural activity from the
rCBF measure, possibly clarifying apparent contradictions
in rCBF data.
In Section 2.2 we suggested that quantitative differences
between integrated synaptic activity and neuronal firing are
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often negligible. However, there are as yet no models which
adequately link neural activity to the BOLD signal, and so
the differences between fMRI and PET methods, which we
have minimized in the present study, deserve much future
study. In particular, we need to develop the “vampire
model” of the neuron to relate synaptic and neuronal activity
and the metabolic costs of synaptic change to rCBF.
Synthetic Brain Imaging is sufficiently flexible that it will
be possible to have network implementations spanning
multiple species. Homologies and differences between
species (cf. Bota & Arbib, 2000) can then be tested more
rigorously using predictions generated by the Synthetic
Brain Imaging, while the human data provide another
form of validation of neural network models derived from
monkey data. It is certainly satisfying when the human
results provide confirmation of the behavior of a model of
diverse interacting biological neural networks, but far more
is learned when there is a mismatch between model predic-
tion and human results. The challenge is then to use these
negative results to further refine and constrain the model
and, on this basis, design new experiments for both primate
neurophysiology and human brain imaging. The resulting
data can then catalyze the development of new global
models which synthesize our evolving understanding of
the human brain in relation to the details we glean from the
anatomy and neurophysiology of the brains of other species.
6.3. Language and “higher cognitive functions”
In “Language Within Our Grasp”, Rizzolatti and Arbib
(1998) showed that the mirror system in monkey is the
homologue of Broca’s area, a crucial speech area in humans,
and argued that this observation provides a neurobiological
“missing link” for the long-argued hypothesis that primitive
forms of communication based on manual gesture preceded
speech in the evolution of language. Their “Mirror System
Hypothesis” states that the matching of neural code for
execution and observation of hand movements in the
monkey is present in the common ancestor of monkey and
human, and is the precursor of the crucial language property
of parity, namely that an utterance usually carries similar
meaning for speaker and hearer (or signer and perceiver,
etc.). Arbib (2000) refines this hypothesis by suggesting
that imitation plays a crucial role in human language acqui-
sition and performance, and that brain mechanisms support-
ing imitation were crucial to the emergence of Homo sapiens.
As already argued, imitation in general requires the abil-
ity to break down a complex performance into a coordinated
control program of schemas which approximate the pieces
of the performance to be imitated. This then provides the
framework in which attention can be shifted to specific
components which can then be tuned and/or fractionated
appropriately, or better coordinated with other components
of the skill. This process is recursive, yielding both the
mastery of ever finer details, and the increasing grace and
accuracy of the overall performance. Arbib (2000) argues
that what marks humans as distinct from their common
ancestors with chimpanzees is that whereas the chimpanzee
can imitate short novel sequences through repeated expo-
sure, humans can acquire (longer) novel sequences in a
single trial if the sequences are not too long and the compo-
nents are relatively familiar. The very structure of these
sequences can serve as the basis for immediate imitation
or for the immediate construction of an appropriate
response, as well as contributing to the longer-term enrich-
ment of behavior. Of course, as sequences get longer, or the
components become less familiar, more and more practice is
required to fully comprehend or imitate the behavior. Arbib
(2000) then analyzes seven hypothesized stages of evolu-
tion: grasping; a mirror system for grasping; a simple imita-
tion system for grasping; a complex imitation system for
grasping; a manual-based communication system; proto-
speech, characterized as being the open-ended production
and perception of sequences of vocal gestures, without
implying that these sequences constitute a language; and,
finally, with cultural evolution predominating over biologi-
cal evolution, speech and languages as we currently know
them. At each stage, the earlier capabilities are preserved.
Moreover, the addition of a new stage may involve enhance-
ment of the repertoire for the primordial behaviors on which
it is based.
Development of the full argument would take us beyond
the scope of this paper. The point to be emphasized here is
that our future work on applying Synthetic Brain Imaging to
global brain function can even address areas of cognitive
science for which no animal data are available if we employ
comparative neuroscience and evolutionary arguments to
relate brain regions for “higher cognitive functions” to
homologous brain regions in other species.
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